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Would the world be a safer place 
without nuclear weapons? To many the 
answer is self-evident: of course it would. 
Nuclear weapons have the capacity to 
do enormous damage. This is indisput-
able. Should we then ban them (abolish 
them, eliminate them)? Again, to many 
(including 100 ‘world leaders’ meeting in 
Paris) and President Obama, speaking in 
Prague, the answer is ‘yes’ and the matter 
one of urgency. Abolition has also been 
a long-term project of the New Zealand 
government in company with its ‘New 
Agenda’ partners. According to Ivo Daal-
der of the Brookings Institution, abolition 
is also favoured by a majority of former 
US Secretaries of State and Defense.1
But is it as simple as this? How feasible, 
or even desirable, is abolition at this time? 
There are well-rehearsed reasons to retain 
at least some of the world’s nuclear arse-
nals on the grounds that, collectively, they 
contribute to global security, through the 
operation of deterrence. It also needs to be 
noted that, at the practical level, abolition 
is much more difficult (for both techni-
cal and political reasons) than its populist 
proponents acknowledge. Together, these 
persistent and profound reservations need 
to be taken seriously.
Abolition project
In the course of his widely-reported and 
rapturously received speech to the people 
of Prague, President Obama committed 
himself ‘to seek the peace and security of 
a world without nuclear weapons.2 The 
President then went on to ‘outline the tra-
jectory we need to be on’. These trajectory 
steps included ‘cuts in nuclear weapon 
stockpiles’ and a ‘reduction in the role of 
nuclear weapons in our national security 
strategy’, a ‘global ban on nuclear test-
ing’ (for which the US Congress would 
need to ratify the Comprehensive Test 
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Ban Treaty) and a fissile materials treaty. 
The Obama ‘trajectory’ would also entail 
strengthening of the Nuclear Non-Prolif-
eration Treaty and renewed efforts to ‘en-
sure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear 
weapon’. Of course, none of these trajec-
tory specifics would amount to abolition 
but they are clearly intended to set the 
pre-conditions for a zero world.
A similar project was announced by 
Global Zero at its formation in early De-
cember 2008, following a two-day meet-
ing by ‘100 political, military, business, 
faith and civic leaders from across politi-
cal lines’.3 Again, ‘deep reductions’ in US 
and Russian arsenals are to be followed 
by a ‘phased and verified’ process, which 
takes nuclear arsenals to zero. Both Global 
Zero and President Obama envisage inter-
national control of the nuclear fuel cycle 
to prevent future development of nuclear 
weapons. Overall, it may be that the only 
difference between the two projects is that 
the President is very clear that the United 
States will not give up its weapons whilst 
others retain them.
 Make no mistake: As long as these 
weapons exist, the United States will 
maintain a safe, secure and effective 
arsenal to deter any adversary and 
guarantee that defence to our al-
lies . . . .4
As noted, some of the projects envisaged 
in Paris and Prague (such as stockpile re-
ductions and a test ban treaty) clearly fall 
short of ‘Abolition’, or ‘Zero’. They will 
thus not be further discussed here. Some-
thing similar applies to many of the so-
called ‘13 Steps’ towards the implemen-
tation of Article VI of the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
although in this case nuclear disarma-
ment is tied (as it is in the NPT Treaty) to 
the even more implausible requirement of 
‘general and complete disarmament under 
effective international control’. The main 
focus of what follows will be on reasons 
for retaining some portion of the world’s 
nuclear arsenals (that is, the place of deter-
rence in global security), on the practical 
and political problems of verification, and 
on controlling the nuclear fuel cycle and 
preventing proliferation.
Deterrence elements
Nuclear deterrence has two distinct ele-
ments to it. At the most fundamental, it 
provides that a party possessing nuclear 
weapons will not use them against an-
other party that is similarly armed for fear 
of unacceptable retaliation. This is some-
times called ‘strict deterrence’ and if this 
were all there was to it, it might seem that 
the problem of unacceptable destruction 
could be solved by all parties agreeing to 
give up their nuclear weapons: the ‘global 
zero’.
But as global security has been struc-
tured since 1945, nuclear arsenals have 
functioned in another way. In the hands 
of major states they have meant that these 
states could not afford to risk serious con-
ventional conflict (however deeply felt 
might be the issue between them) for fear 
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that nuclear weapons would ultimately be 
used. This is ‘extended deterrence’ and it 
is this inhibition of conflict between the 
major states (the prevention of a Third 
World War) that would be lost in the 
event of nuclear abolition.
Extended deterrence does not guar-
antee against any nuclear weapon use. 
As President Obama noted in his Prague 
speech, there is the possibility that terror-
ists might get hold of sufficient material 
to make and detonate a crude weapon 
and it is less obvious how they might be 
‘deterred’. Similarly, if there is a period of 
proliferation in which smaller and, per-
haps, less politically stable states acquire 
nuclear weapons, there may be occasions 
on which weapons (of whatever degree 
of sophistication) get used. And this will 
particularly apply where the states have, 
on the face of it, little to lose (like North 
Korea) or (like Iran) may be driven by 
millenarian aspirations.5 In the Iran case, 
the answer is to make a better effort at 
counter-proliferation, whilst we still can. 
To focus on nuclear abolition would be to 
throw out the ‘deterrence baby’ with the 
anti-nuclear bathwater.
Different problem
Preventing terrorists from making or get-
ting nuclear weapons is a different prob-
lem, but there are technical reasons for 
thinking that terrorists are very unlikely 
to construct an effective nuclear device 
without help from a nuclear capable state 
and this should be the focus of counter-
proliferation activity. It may also be worth 
noting that, in the event that the state 
help was with providing fissile material, 
any detonation is likely to carry a foren-
sic signature that would point to the state 
concerned and might thus bring forth 
retribution: ‘extended deterrence’ in a 
further extended sense. As noted earlier, it 
would be American policy not to give up 
its nuclear weapons until everybody else 
did likewise. There would be no unilat-
eral gesture. Insofar as this would apply 
to most, if not all, of the present nuclear 
weapon states, it is presumed that the 
parties would progressively reduce their 
arsenals until a final renunciation would 
be made simultaneously. At that point, it 
would seem that all parties would need to 
have equally strong reasons for doing so. If 
this is right, how plausible is it that such a 
condition would be fulfilled?
Thinking simply of historical relations 
between the United States and Soviet Un-
ion/Russia, it seems clear that the relative 
importance of nuclear weapons has shifted 
over time. For most of the Cold War, the 
Soviet Union was perceived to have supe-
riority in conventional forces. At this time 
nuclear weapons were more important to 
the United States as a strategic counter-
balance. After the end of communism, 
there was a period when the run-down 
state of Russian conventional forces was 
such that there was an emphasis by the 
new Russian regime on (tactical) nuclear 
weapons to redress the balance. Now the 
balance may have altered again.
In each of these situations there was 
a party who would have been advantaged 
by the bilateral elimination of nuclear 
weapons and one who would not. There 
is a general point here. Nuclear weapons 
are part of a fundamental strategic sym-
metry dynamic. Between any potential 
adversary pair (or combination of group-
ings) there will never be an equality of 
interest in total nuclear disarmament. 
Of course, it is possible to imagine global 
security conditions in which these asym-
metries  are of relatively small importance. 
But that is scarcely the world we see today, 
or the world we might reasonably envisage 
on the basis of present antagonisms and 
fundamental conflicts of interest
First step
In relation to this, Daalder thinks that 
the United States should not retain nu-
clear weapons for this kind of strategic 
purpose but simply keep them ‘to prevent 
the use of nuclear weapons by others’ (that 
is, strict deterrence) and that this should 
be the ‘first step’ towards global zero. The 
rational for this is that ‘US conventional 
military power is more than sufficient to 
defeat any other conventional military 
force’. That assertion may be debatable, 
even in the case of the United States. 
More generally, nuclear weapons still have 
the potential to offset conventional infe-
riority.
It is beyond the scope of this article 
to review the totality of security issues 
that confront the various present nuclear 
capable states but it may be worth noting 
the situation of the state of Israel. In what 
circumstances can it be imagined that Is-
rael would give up its nuclear weapons? 
Given the history of the last 60 years, dur-
ing which its existence has been regularly 
under threat, and given also the intensity 
of anti-semitism amongst its neighbours,6 
what guarantees could be given to induce 
that state to even contemplate nuclear 
disarmament, especially whilst the most 
vitriolic of its enemies is actually develop-
ing a nuclear capability of its own? At the 
time of writing, there is a fresh effort to 
‘solve the Palestinian problem’, via a nego-
tiated ‘two-state solution’. Even the most 
optimistic assessment of how this might 
go does not alter the forgoing assessment, 
although it might give grounds for some 
optimism (say) twenty years down the 
track.
Abolition problems
Apart from the collective and individual 
security benefits that might be thought to 
arise from deterrence, there is a spectrum 
of practical and conceptual difficulties in 
the global-zero project. There is a major-
problem in specifying what a world with-
out nuclear weapons would look like and, 
particularly, in establishing a verification 
regime that would, on the one hand, reas-
sure all parties and, on the other, repre-
sent (to all parties) an acceptable level of 
intrusion. In the end, it may be that such 
a regime is ‘impossible.
For the purposes of the present dis-
cussion, it is taken that the term ‘nuclear 
weapon’ refers to a nuclear explosive device 
and does not include radiological disper-
sal weapons based on chemical explosives. 
On this understanding, a nuclear weapon 
is a contrivance for the rapid evolution of 
the energy produced by bringing together 
sub-critical masses of fissile material (ei-
ther uranium-235 or plutonium-239), to-
gether with some kind of delivery system. 
This may be a bomb (and suitable aero-
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plane), or missile warhead (with the cor-
responding missile), or artillery projectile, 
or a less-sophisticated arrangement which 
might consist of some sort of sub-critical 
mass-assembly arrangement, constructed 
and transported in a shipping container.
The range of possible ‘nuclear weap-
ons’ may even include a set-up from which 
(given sufficient weapons-grade uranium 
and a would-be suicide bomber) a blast of 
5–10 kilotons could be achieved by mere-
ly dropping one 50-kilogram sub-critical 
mass onto another from a height of two 
metres.7 This notional list does nor in-
clude thermonuclear weapons (hydrogen 
bombs) since, with present technology, 
these require a fission device to initiate 
them.
Separation requirement
Abolition of nuclear weapons would have 
to entail more than merely requiring the 
separation of made-up bombs, warheads, 
or projectiles from the corresponding 
bombers, missiles, or artillery pieces. This 
might have some security benefit in that 
it would introduce some element of delay 
into the process of delivery and thus re-
duce the possibility of ‘accidents’ (some-
times called ‘de-alerting’ ), but this would 
not really amount to abolition, since it 
would not prevent nuclear weapons be-
ing used. Similarly, the separation of the 
fissile material (the ‘pits’) from the cor-
responding assembly mechanism would 
only introduce an uncertain delay and a 
clear challenge to weapons technologists. 
In this connection, it may be worth not-
ing that the very first nuclear weapon was 
assembled en route.
With these considerations in mind, it 
would seem that nuclear abolition would 
at least need to entail a prohibition on the 
possession of appropriate fissile material, 
whether or not it was made up into pits. 
This has sometimes been called a ‘fissban’ 
and there have been efforts over many 
years to get a treaty to this effect.8 In part, 
the problem turns on what may be under-
stood as appropriate fissile material from a 
weapon-making point of view. The arse-
nals of the major nuclear weapon states are 
based on uranium or plutonium, which is 
at an enrichment of over 90 per cent, but 
experts in the field claim that some kind 
of weapon can be made with material of 
lower enrichment (the Hiroshima bomb, 
itself, probably contained only 80 per cent 
uranium-235). Again, some experts claim 
that a nuclear weapon can be made from 
uranium of only 20 per cent enrichment 
(the lower limit of the term ‘highly-en-
riched uranium’, HEU). In this case, the 
critical mass is said to be 800 kilograms, 
which may raise questions about its prac-
tical suitability for weapon production.
Another complication
There is another complication here and 
that is that reactors for special purposes 
may need higher enrichment than the 
around 5 per cent enrichment of fuel for 
common commercial light-water reactors. 
This used to apply particularly to research 
or isotope-production reactors. Precisely 
because of the proliferation implications 
of this technology, there has been a pro-
gressive switch to lower enrichments. 
However, there are other technologies 
that require very much higher enrich-
ments than ordinary commercial power 
reactors. An example of this is the Russian 
development of floating nuclear power 
plants. The precise level of enrichment in 
the fuel has not been officially revealed, 
but scientists involved in the project have 
indicated that it is ‘well above 20%’.9 For 
the present, these floating reactors are des-
tined for the Russian Arctic. If they turn 
out to be tolerably economic, however, 
they may appeal to other users. It is inher-
ent in the design that the barges are towed 
back to ‘home-base’ for refuelling, but, 
insofar as others build or operate such fa-
cilities, they would need highly-enriched 
uranium.
High fuel enrichments are also typical 
of submarine propulsion systems. These 
typically have been in the range 20–45 
per cent but some later Soviet vessels oper-
ated on fuels of 90 per cent enrichment 
(that is, weapons-grade uranium). To date 
this has not been a proliferation problem 
since the operators of nuclear submarines 
were the nuclear weapon states. This 
may be changing. Brazil has recently an-
nounced plans to build (in co-operation 
with France) a nuclear-propelled subma-
rine and Australia has also considered it. 
The point here is that states that make this 
move would have highly-enriched mate-
rial under their control and, since we are 
talking here of military rather than civil-
ian facilities, they are much less likely to 
accept international scrutiny.
The question that now arises is what 
sort of verification regime could be estab-
lished that would encompass the range 
of situations outlined above? Those who 
propose abolition must provide a detailed 
schedule of what needs to be accounted for 
in the way of plant and material, what sort 
of inspectorate needs to be established, 
and with what powers. They may also 
need to supply some grounds for thinking 
that states are likely to accept the level of 
intrusion that such a verification regime 
would entail. At a practical level, it may be 
asked, how would verification proceed in 
contemporary Pakistan, or North Korea? 
Unless satisfactory answers to these ques-
tions can be produced, the zero project 
(even if considered desirable) cannot be 
considered realistic.
Nuclear potential
Many countries, including those that 
have no nuclear arsenals and no plans to 
acquire them, have enrichment facilities 
that are producing civilian nuclear fuel 
but which could be adapted to produce 
weapons-grade material. They may also 
have plant which is capable of reprocess-
ing spent fuel from their power reactors. 
Through this they are able to separate the 
plutonium that is produced in the fuel 
rods. If this spent fuel is from commer-
cial light-water reactors, operating in their 
normal mode, the separated plutonium 
will contain only around 60 per cent of 
plutonium-239, which is the fissile isotope. 
Although there is some debate about how 
usable this material is for making nuclear 
weapons, there is no doubt at all that the 
plant could produce weapons-grade mate-
rial (that is 90 per cent plus plutonium-
239) if it were fed with appropriate spent 
fuel (perhaps from a dedicated reactor).
States that have either or both of these 
two ‘sensitive’ technologies will also have 
‘feedstock’ on hand, a sophisticated en-
gineering sector and a community of nu-
clear experts. They will have all they need 
to make nuclear weapons and, probably 
quite sophisticated weapons. It would be 
simply a question of how long it would 
take. And it might be supposed that in 
many countries of this kind, there will be 
persons in the defence or nuclear hierar-
chy that have already thought about this 
and know exactly what they would do 
and how long it would take. These states 
are virtual nuclear weapon states. What-
ever their present intentions and whatever 
their record of compliance with the IAEA 
safeguard regime, they could become 
nuclear capable if their security situation
demanded it.
Uncertain outcome
The significance of this conclusion is that 
this state of affairs is what would be the 
outcome if abolition/global zero were 
achieved whilst civilian nuclear activity 
continued. Most former nuclear weapon 
states would merely have become vir-
tual nuclear weapon states. To go further 
would require the complete removal of the 
key technologies of the nuclear fuel cycle 
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from individual sovereign control, or the 
abandonment of civilian nuclear tech-
nology altogether. It is assumed that this 
would be neither desirable nor possible at 
this time and the project will not be con-
sidered further here. In the light of this, 
it may be concluded that the abolition 
of nuclear weapons, in the (strong) sense 
that it is guaranteed that such weapons are 
never used, is also not possible, since the 
knowledge and the technology will con-
tinue to be present. The best that could 
be done is abolition in the weaker sense 
that nuclear arsenals are not immediately 
available. We might then have the worst 
of both worlds. Nuclear deterrence would 
be lost but nuclear weapons might get 
used anyway.
The greatest present danger does not 
lie in the arsenals of the existing nuclear 
powers (large though some of these are) 
but in proliferation. Not only is continu-
ing appeasement of Iran likely to produce 
a nuclear capable state and a much greater 
risk that terrorists get fissile material but 
it is also likely to trigger a proliferation 
surge in neighbouring Sunni states. Simi-
larly, the late May 2009 failure to prevent 
North Korea from testing a second nu-
clear weapon will have emboldened other 
states that have nuclear ambitions. To re-
turn to the main issue, it surely cannot be 
imagined that there could be any progress 
towards nuclear disarmament whilst the 
number of nuclear capable states contin-
ues to increase. If the international com-
munity cannot prevent proliferation, it 
cannot hope to make progress towards a 
nuclear weapon-free world.
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